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Samuel R. Bagenstos*

Nevada Department of Human
Resources v. Hibbs:
Universalism and Reproductive
Justice
The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) was the first bill signed
into law by President Bill Clinton—just two weeks after he took office.1
Enactment of the statute was a longstanding goal of the Democratic
Party.2 It also represented a legislative victory for what I will call feminist
universalism—the notion that sex equality is best served by rules and
policies that reject differentiation between women and men. Ten years
after Congress enacted the FMLA, the Supreme Court upheld the statute
against a constitutional challenge in Nevada Department of Human
Resources v. Hibbs.3 The Hibbs Court, in a surprising opinion by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, relied heavily on feminist universalist arguments.
Even at the time of Hibbs, though, evidence was accumulating that the
FMLA’s universalist approach was not sufficient to achieve the
underlying goals of feminist lawyers and activists: disestablishing
gender-role stereotypes and promoting equal opportunities for women
and men throughout society. Hibbs thus represents the triumph of
feminist universalism, even as it highlights the limitations of the feminist
universalist project.
THE FMLA AND FEMINIST UNIVERSALISM
Understanding where the FMLA came from—and the constitutional
issues in Hibbs—requires examining what drew leading American
feminists to frame the statute in universalist terms.

Frank G. Millard Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.
See RONALD D. ELVING, CONFLICT AND COMPROMISE: HOW CONGRESS MAKES THE
LAW 11 (1995).
2
See, e.g., 1988 Democratic Party Platform, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.
presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29609 (“We believe that Government should set the
standard in recognizing that worker productivity is enhanced . . . by family leave policies
that no longer force employees to choose between their jobs and their children or ailing
parents . . . .”).
3
538 U.S. 721 (2003).
*
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Second-Wave Feminism and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
From its start in the early 1960s, second-wave feminism aimed to
untether the biological function of reproduction from social roles and
social status. Key second-wave texts like Betty Friedan’s The Feminine
Mystique described a world in which women were largely confined to the
tasks of raising children and managing the home. That world, they
argued, improperly treated biology as destiny. It imposed significant
psychological costs on individual women and deprived women as a group
of full and equal status in society. Friedan, for example, wrote that a
woman “who has no goal, no purpose, no ambition patterning her days
into the future, making her stretch and grow beyond that small score of
years in which her body can fill its biological function, is committing a
kind of suicide.”4
Feminist lawyers pursued three distinct but interlocking strategies
to help ensure that a woman’s biology would not be her destiny.5 One
strategy was to seek statutes and judicial rulings that promoted access to
contraception and abortion. If women could choose whether and when to
have children, they could time their parenting decisions to minimize
interference with the educational and job prospects that were essential to
full and equal status in the community. A second strategy was to seek
federal programs that provided childcare directly. A federally funded
network of childcare centers could remove both financial and social
barriers to new mothers reentering the workforce. The third strategy
focused not on the government but on private employers. Feminist
lawyers sought legal regulation of the employment process to bar
employers from treating mothers and pregnant women as second-class
citizens. And because social stereotypes treated the ideal role of women
as mothers and homemakers, this strategy naturally extended to barring
discrimination against women in the workplace generally. As Professor
Deborah Dinner has explained, “Upending the family-wage system would
require more than the right to formal, equal treatment. Feminists also
fought for the redistribution of childrearing labor between women and
men in the home, as well as the redistribution of the costs of pregnancy,
childbirth, and childrearing between the family and society.”6 The FMLA
arose most directly from the third of these—feminist efforts to regulate
the workplace.
Feminist lawyers initially relied on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, which prohibits employment discrimination based not just on
race but also on sex.7 Although the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) and other elites initially treated the law’s
BETTY FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE 280 (50th anniversary ed. 2013).
For an extensive discussion of the three prongs of this strategy, see Robert C. Post
& Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric
Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 1986–89 (2003).
6
Deborah Dinner, The Costs of Reproduction: History and the Legal Construction
of Sex Equality, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 415, 419 (2011).
7
42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a) (2012).
4
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prohibition on sex discrimination as an accident or a joke, by the late
1960s the EEOC and the courts had begun to take that prohibition
seriously.8 Advocates used Title VII to challenge employers who
attempted to force pregnant women to quit their jobs or take excessive
leave.9 And where the employer was the government—as in the large
number of cases involving teachers driven out of their jobs once it became
apparent they were pregnant—those lawyers made Fourteenth
Amendment claims as well. These efforts had some initial success in the
EEOC and the courts.10
But the Supreme Court ultimately ruled in 1974’s Geduldig v.
Aiello11 that discrimination against pregnant women is not inherently sex
discrimination for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. Two years
later, in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,12 the Court applied the same
analysis to Title VII. Rejecting the EEOC’s interpretation, the Court held
that the statute does not prohibit disparate treatment of pregnant
women. As the Court explained, quoting its earlier opinion in Geduldig,
pregnancy discrimination divides the workplace “into two groups—
pregnant women and nonpregnant persons. While the first group is
exclusively female, the second includes members of both sexes.”13
Feminist lawyers immediately responded by urging passage of a new
law that would expressly treat pregnancy discrimination as a form of sex
discrimination.14 They succeeded when Congress adopted the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act (PDA) in 1978.15 The PDA contained two key clauses.
The first defined sex discrimination to include discrimination on the basis
of pregnancy.16 The second tied employers’ treatment of pregnancy to
their treatment of other disabilities in the workplace: “[W]omen affected
8
See HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF
NATIONAL POLICY, 1960–1972, at 207–11, 229–32 (1990); see also Cary Franklin, Inventing
the “Traditional Concept” of Sex Discrimination, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1333–58 (2012).
9
See Deborah A. Widiss, Gilbert Redux: The Interaction of the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act and the Amended Americans with Disabilities Act, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
961, 989–91 (2013).
10
Cf. Stanley Schair, Sex Discrimination: The Pregnancy-Related Disability
Exclusion, 49 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 684, 689–91 (1975) (describing how circuits were split on
whether mandatory maternity leave policies for teachers violated the Fourteenth
Amendment before the Supreme Court in Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur struck
down a mandatory leave regulation as unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause);
Comment, Mandatory Maternity Leave: Title VII and Equal Protection, 14 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1026, 1026–27 (1973) (noting that before LaFleur and Geduldig v. Aiello, “the success
of a constitutional attack on mandatory maternity leave policies necessarily depend[ed]
upon the jurisdiction in which an action [was] brought”).
11
417 U.S. 484 (1974). For discussion of Geduldig, see Debbie Dinner, Sex Equality
and the U.S. Welfare Regime: The Story of Geduldig v. Aiello, in REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AND
JUSTICE STORIES ___ (Murray, Shaw, & Siegel eds. 2019).
12
429 U.S. 125 (1976).
13
Id. at 135 (quoting Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496 n.20).
14
See Dinner, supra note 6, at 469–70.
15
Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000(k) (2012)).
16
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (“The terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’ include,
but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions . . . .”).
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by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated
the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of
benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected
but similar in their ability or inability to work.”17 Taken together, these
clauses overturned both the holding and the reasoning in Gilbert. They
required employers who give leave or other accommodations to
temporarily disabled employees to do the same for similarly-affected
pregnant employees. And they barred employers from treating workers
adversely simply because they are pregnant.
The congressional hearings on the PDA included testimony from a
number of prominent feminist attorneys. These attorneys explained that
the purpose of the law was not just to attack a narrow problem but to
eliminate the broad stereotypes and practices that limited women’s
workplace opportunities generally. Georgetown Law Professor Wendy
Williams, for example, identified employers’ treatment of pregnancy as
the keystone of workplace inequality. She testified that “the common
thread of justification running through all the policies and practices that
discriminate against women in the labor force rested ultimately on one
fact: The capacity and reality of pregnancy.”18 Employers’ “assumptions
about pregnancy and its implications for the role of women, and the
behavior of women, led to the view that women were marginal workers,
not really deserving of the emoluments and pay of real workers.”19 And
because all women of childbearing age are “viewed by employers among
the potentially pregnant,” the “stereotype that all women are marginal
workers” had broad effects on “hiring, promotion, job assignments, and
fringe benefits.”20
The PDA rested heavily on the premises of feminist universalism. In
particular, the statute seemed to incorporate a “sameness” feminism.21
The second clause seemed to do so explicitly with its “shall be treated the
same” language.22 So long as women were the same as men, the statute
appeared to say, they should be treated the same. Susan Deller Ross, then

Id.
Legislation to Prohibit Sex Discrimination on the Basis of Pregnancy: Hearing on
H.R. 5055 & H.R. 6075 Before the Subcomm. on Emp’t Opportunities of the H. Comm. on
Educ. & Labor, 95th Cong. 43 (1977) [hereinafter House Hearing] (statement of Wendy
Williams, Professor of Law, Georgetown Law School).
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Cf. Dinner, supra note 6, at 444 (arguing that the turn toward formal equality
arguments by feminist lawyers during this period is “better understood not as an ideological
competition between difference and sameness feminism, special and equal treatment, but
rather as a strategic conflict about how to remedy the economic costs that the family-wage
system imposed on women”). See generally Mary Becker, The Sixties Shift to Formal
Equality and the Courts: An Argument for Pragmatism and Politics, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV.
209 (1998) (arguing that by 1970, feminist lawyers had turned decisively toward sameness
feminism).
22
§ 2000e(k).
17
18
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of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU),23 underscored the theme
in her testimony on the bill. “Most women are able to work through most
of their pregnancies,” she said. “They should be allowed to work like any
other able workers.”24 At the same time, she recognized, “all pregnant
women have some period of medical disability” from labor through “3 to
8 weeks after childbirth,” and “[t]hese disabled women should likewise be
given the same fringe benefits all other medically disabled workers get.”25
Although proponents of the PDA aimed to eliminate important
barriers to workplace equality, the model of sameness feminism seemed
likely to have a limited impact. It would protect those women who could
overcome employer-imposed barriers to succeeding in a man’s world, but
it would not change the background conditions that made it a man’s world
in the first place.26
Of course, most of the PDA’s feminist advocates did not endorse such
a narrow and formal approach to equality. Their efforts to secure the
availability of abortion and childcare reflected a goal not just to require
employers to treat women the same as men, but to change the social
structures that created the context for workplace and other inequalities—
in particular, the social structures that gave women sole or primary
responsibility for childrearing. Still, as attempts to secure public funding
for abortion ran aground and the push for a national childcare program
stalled, the PDA’s sameness model stood as the most powerful example
of legal feminism in the statute books.
To be sure, feminists did not abandon efforts to move beyond the
sameness model. As I show in the next section, intra-feminist debates on
these questions remained robust—and played a crucial role in the
development of the FMLA. And the limitations of a sameness approach
were increasingly apparent. Biology aside, social norms meant that
women were more likely to take time off to care for newborn children than
men. This time off went beyond the “period of medical disability”27 for
which the PDA might provide some protection—it was about childcare,
not physical recovery from pregnancy and childbirth. Unless employers
were required to give new mothers maternity leave—and protect those
new mothers against adverse treatment when they returned—women
would face an obstacle to continuing in the workforce that men did not.
Pregnancy Leave Laws and the Move Toward the FMLA
Responding to this problem, activists in some states secured
enactment of laws that required employers to provide maternity leave.28
23
Susan Deller Ross, ACLU WOMEN’S RTS. PROJECT, https://www.aclu.org/files/
womensrights/tribute/3.html (last visited May 18, 2018).
24
House Hearing, supra note18, at 48 (statement of Susan Deller Ross, ACLU).
25
Id.
26
See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE
L.J. 1281, 1287 (1991).
27
House Hearing, supra note 18, at 48 (statement of Susan Deller Ross, ACLU).
28
See Dinner, supra note 6, at 474.
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Some of these statutes predated the PDA; others, like California’s, were
enacted later.29 California’s law, in particular, became a major focus of
controversy. That law required employers to provide mothers up to four
months of leave following childbirth.30 Although the statute did not
require employers to pay new mothers for their maternity leave time, it
did prohibit them from firing or demoting new mothers for taking that
leave.31
As Justice Ginsburg later explained, “[t]he California law sharply
divided women’s rights advocates”:
“Equal-treatment” feminists asserted it violated the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act’s (PDA) commitment to treating pregnancy
the same as other disabilities. It did so by requiring leave only
for disability caused by pregnancy and childbirth, thereby
treating pregnancy as sui generis. “Equal-opportunity”
feminists disagreed, urging that the California law was
consistent with the PDA because it remedied the discriminatory
burden that inadequate leave policies placed on a woman’s right
to procreate.32
When business groups filed suit to challenge the California maternityleave mandate as preempted by the PDA, the competing groups of
feminists filed competing briefs in the case.33 Joan Bertin of the ACLU
explained the position of the “equal treatment” feminists she represented:
“The notion that pregnancy is a special disability is a stereotype, and
stereotypes hurt us. The only way to eradicate that is to put pregnancy
in the context of the whole range of things that happen to people over a
lifetime.”34 But no less an icon than Betty Friedan took the other side of
the argument:
I think the time has come to acknowledge that women are
different from men, and that there has to be a concept of
equality that takes into account that women are the ones who
have the babies. We shouldn’t be stuck with always using a male
model, trying to twist pregnancy into something that’s like a
hernia.35
29
See Brief for the National Conference of State Legislators et al. as Amici Curiae
at 16–17, California Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Guerra, 1986 WL 728371 (June 12,
1986).
30
See Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 275–76 (1987) (describing
California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act, which had been amended in 1978 to
prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of pregnancy).
31
Id.
32
Coleman v. Court of Appeals, 566 U.S. 30, 48 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
33
See Tamar Lewin, Maternity-Leave Suit Has Divided Feminists, N.Y. TIMES (June
28, 1986), http://www.nytimes.com/1986/06/28/style/maternity-leave-suit-has-dividedfeminists.html.
34
Id.
35
Id.
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The Supreme Court ultimately upheld the California law on two
alternative grounds that, together, might have bridged the internecine
conflict among women’s rights activists. The first ground, which
resonated with the claims of the “equal opportunity” feminists, was that
the state’s maternity-leave law and the PDA “share a common goal” of
“allow[ing] women, as well as men, to have families without losing their
jobs.”36 The second, which accepted the “equal treatment” feminists’
interpretation of the PDA for purposes of argument, was that employers
could comply with both the state and federal statutes by granting four
months’ maternity leave and also giving “comparable benefits to other
disabled employees.”37
After the Supreme Court’s decision, Representative Howard
Berman, who had authored the California law when he was in the state
legislature, sought to introduce a maternity-leave bill in Congress.38
Feminist activists, aided in particular by Colorado Representative Pat
Schroeder and Donna Lenhoff of the Women’s Legal Defense Fund,
successfully prevailed on Representative Berman to frame his federal bill
consistently with feminist universalism—that is, by avoiding any legal
distinction between men and women, whether pregnant or otherwise.
That bill eventually became the Family and Medical Leave Act.39 Rather
than being limited to maternity leave, the new law guaranteed both
mothers and fathers leave for the birth of a child.40 It also guaranteed to
workers, regardless of their sex, leave to take care of certain family
members with “serious health condition[s]”—or to address their own
“serious health condition[s].”41 Covered employers were required to make
a total of twelve weeks of unpaid leave available to each covered employee
each year for these purposes.42
In framing the FMLA as a form of universal job protection, the goal
of feminist lawyers was not to deny differences between women and
men—or even to reject the proposition that employers should
accommodate those differences. The goal was to broaden the frame, so
that those differences could be accommodated in a way that didn’t target
women for special treatment.
Special treatment was seen as harmful to women in two ways. First,
it entrenched social stereotypes that limited women’s opportunities. A
law guaranteeing parental leave to women, but not men, placed the
imprimatur of the state on the proposition that taking care of children
was women’s work. By contrast, a law guaranteeing parental leave to all

36
37
38
39
40
41
42

Cal. Fed., 479 U.S. at 288, 289.
Id. at 291.
See ELVING, supra note 1, at 18–20.
See id. at 20–23, 29–34.
29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(A) (2012).
Id. § 2612(a)(1)(C)–(D).
Id. § 2612(a)(1).
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parents might shift caretaking patterns by removing an obstacle to men
who wished to take time off to care for their family members.43
Second, and perhaps more concretely, special treatment encouraged
discrimination against women by making them costlier to employ. If the
law required parental leave for female but not male employees, an
employer would have an incentive to hire only men so it could avoid that
mandate. But if both men and women had the right to take leave, perhaps
that would blunt the incentive to discriminate.44 Of course, social norms
would likely continue to mean that women would be more likely in
practice to take parental or family-care leave. To address that concern,
the statute’s drafters also included personal-care leave in the FMLA’s
package of entitlements. The idea was that men would be at least as likely
as women to take personal-care leave, so that the statute’s new mandate
would not, as a whole, give employers much incentive to discriminate
against women.45 The FMLA ultimately passed in this universalist form,
though Congress limited the law to fairly large employers.46
WILLIAM HIBBS’S CASE
Hibbs’s Accident and His Wife’s Surgery
William Hibbs worked for the State of Nevada’s welfare agency.47 On
Mother’s Day of 1996, he was driving his Ford pickup truck with his
family in Reno when another driver ran a red light and crashed into
them.48 William tore his rotator cuff in the crash, and his two children
also experienced minor injuries.49 His wife, Diane, was not so lucky. She
seriously injured her neck and spine—and she required extensive
treatment.50 She had surgery in October 1996, but that did not alleviate
her severe pain.51 By the following spring, as William’s lawyers explained
in one of their briefs to the Supreme Court, Diane had “suffered a range
of serious medical complications, including liver damage and addiction as
a result of prescribed pain medication, anxiety attacks, clinical

43
See Donna Lenhoff & Claudia Withers, Implementation of the Family and Medical
Leave Act: Toward the Family-Friendly Workplace, 3 J. GENDER & L. 39, 49–50 (1994).
44
See Dinner, supra note 6, at 475.
45
See Julie C. Suk, Are Gender Stereotypes Bad for Women? Rethinking
Antidiscrimination Law and Work-Family Conflict, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 43 (2010).
46
29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(i) (2012) (defining “employer” for the purposes of the act as
“any person engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting commerce who
employs 50 or more employees for each working day during each of 20 or more calendar
workweeks in the current or preceding calendar year”).
47
Brief in Opposition at *2, Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003)
(No. 01-1368), 2001 WL 34116242.
48
Former State Worker Pitted Against Nevada in Supreme Court Family Leave Case,
LAS VEGAS SUN (Jan. 12, 2003, 7:30 AM), https://lasvegassun.com/news/2003/jan/12/formerstate-worker-pitted-against-nevada-in-supre/ [hereinafter Worker Pitted Against Nevada].
49
Id. (“Hibbs tore a rotator cuff and his two younger children suffered scrapes and
bruises . . . .”).
50
Id.
51
Brief in Opposition, supra note 47, at *3.
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depression, and suicidal tendencies, necessitating at one point that she
be admitted to a hospital psychiatric unit.”52
One condition in particular required further surgery: Diane “had a
metal plate with screws in her neck from which the screws stripped and
loosened to the point of pressing against her esophagus, requiring her to
be extremely careful when moving her body so as to avoid a potentially
fatal puncture.”53 The surgery could not be scheduled until November
1997, however, due to the specialist surgeon’s availability.54 During the
interim period, William sought leave from his job to care for Diane.55
William requested the full twelve weeks of leave under the FMLA.56
On June 23, 1997, his employer granted the request to take unpaid FMLA
leave as needed to care for his spouse.57 William took that leave
intermittently until August 5, when he began taking the leave on a fulltime basis.58 On August 11, he began to receive paid leave donated by his
coworkers pursuant to a workplace leave-bank program; at that point, he
had used approximately three weeks of his twelve-week allocation of
FMLA leave.59 His coworkers donated just over nine weeks of paid leave,
which William believed would not count against his FMLA allocation.60
He planned to take the donated leave until it ran out in October, then
revert to unpaid FMLA leave through the end of the year—which would
cover Diane’s surgery and initial recovery.61
Contrary to William’s expectations, his employer did count the
donated paid leave against his twelve-week FMLA allocation; under that
calculation, his FMLA entitlement expired in October.62 His employer
ordered him to return to work by November 12 or face discipline.63 When
he did not return because he still needed to care for his wife, the employer
fired him for being “absent without leave.”64
Diane eventually had her surgery in December—one of “a dozen
expensive operations in California and Arizona.”65 William found parttime work for the Federal Department of Housing and Urban
Development, and the family had to survive on a combination of Diane’s

52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

Id.
Id. at *3–4 (citation omitted).
Id. at *4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *5.
Id.
Id. at *4–5.
Id. at *5.
Id. at *5–6.
Id. at *7.
Id. at *7–8.
Worker Pitted Against Nevada, supra note 48.
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disability payments and his $1,000 monthly wages from that job.66 The
Hibbses paid their bills “by selling off horses, three off-road vehicles, two
classic cars, a truck, van, and eventually [William’s] house near Virginia
City. The family moved into a $6,500 mining home that had been
abandoned for eight years.”67
Hibbs’s Lawsuit and the Supreme Court’s
Sovereign Immunity Cases
In April 1998, William Hibbs filed a lawsuit against the State of
Nevada for violating his rights under the FMLA. By counting the banked
leave donated by his coworkers against his twelve-week FMLA allocation
without giving him sufficient advance notice, he alleged, the state had
violated the statute. He also alleged that the state had violated the
statute by retaliating against him for invoking his FMLA rights.68 He
sought reinstatement with back pay, plus damages.69
The FMLA provides for damages and back pay,70 as well as
injunctive relief.71 And it treats state government employers, like William
Hibbs’s, identically to private employers.72 When Congress adopted the
statute in 1993, there was no legal reason for Congress to draw a
distinction between public-sector and private-sector employment. The
Supreme Court had held in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority in 1985 that Congress can apply the same labor standards laws
to state and local government employers as it applies to private
employers.73 And the Court had also held in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas
Co. in 1989 that there is no constitutional bar to Congress authorizing
suits against state governments for damages for violations of federal
statutes.74
By the time William Hibbs filed his suit, though, a lot had changed.
Under the leadership of Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court had
begun what many have called a “federalism revolution.”75 In 1996, Chief
Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for the Court in Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Florida overruled Union Gas and held that Congress could not authorize
damages suits against states.76 Rather, the Eleventh Amendment—or at
Id.
Id.
68
Brief in Opposition, supra note47, at *8.
69
Id.
70
29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)(A) (2012).
71
Id. § 2617(a)(1)(B).
72
Id. § 2611(4)(A)(iii) (defining “[t]he term ‘employer’ ” to “include[ ] any ‘public
agency’ ”).
73
469 U.S. 528 (1985).
74
491 U.S. 1 (1989).
75
See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, A COURT DIVIDED: THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE
FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 249 (2005); Linda Greenhouse, The Revolution Next
Time?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2010, 8:00 PM), https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/12/
16/the-revolution-next-time.
76
517 U.S. 44 (1996).
66
67

SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS

11

least the constitutional “presupposition” that the Eleventh Amendment
“confirms”—provided that the state, as sovereign, was immune from such
suits.77
Seminole Tribe reaffirmed the Court’s prior holding that Congress
could override a state’s sovereign immunity if it acted under its power to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.78 But the very next year, the Court
limited the circumstances in which Congress could exercise that power.
In its 1997 decision in City of Boerne v. Flores,79 the Court withdrew its
prior suggestion that Congress had some authority to determine the
substantive meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.80 Rather, Boerne
held that Congress’s enforcement power is tied to the Court’s own
interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment: Congress can act to
prevent, deter, or remedy conduct that the Court would believe to be in
violation of that Amendment, but Congress cannot declare conduct to be
a violation of the Amendment if the Court believes that conduct to be
constitutional.81
The Case in the Lower Courts
Seminole Tribe and Boerne posed a problem for Hibbs’s case. They
meant that Hibbs could not recover damages from the state for his
injuries unless the FMLA was “congruent and proportional” to
Fourteenth Amendment violations recognized by the Supreme Court.
And the FMLA’s universal framing suggested that the statute went
beyond simply prohibiting unconstitutional sex discrimination. If the
problem was sex discrimination, a guarantee of 12 weeks of leave for
every covered worker would seem to go well beyond solving that problem.
A state could avoid unconstitutional discrimination by giving its workers
any amount of leave—12 weeks, 6 weeks, or even no leave at all—so long
as male and female workers got the same thing. Applying that logic, the
district court ruled that Hibbs’s FMLA claim against the state was barred
by sovereign immunity.82
Hibbs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit. By the time the Ninth Circuit decided the case, seven other
federal courts of appeals had addressed the question whether the FMLA
was a valid exercise of Congress’s power to enforce the Fourteenth

Id. at 54 (quoting Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991)).
See id. at 59 (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 452–56 (1976)).
79
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
80
See id. at 527–28 (“There is language in our opinion in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384
U.S. 641 (1966), which could be interpreted as acknowledging a power in Congress to enact
legislation that expands the rights contained in § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. This is
not a necessary interpretation, however, or even the best one.”).
81
Id. at 519–20.
82
Transcript of Motion Nos. 54 and 55, Hibbs v. Dep’t. of Human Res., No. CV-N98-205-HDM(PHA), 2004 WL 5267600 (D. Nev. June 3, 1999).
77
78
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Amendment. All of them had held, consistent with the district court’s
decision, that it was not.83
But the Ninth Circuit panel that heard Hibbs’s appeal consisted of
three of the most liberal judges on the federal appellate bench. The most
senior judge on the panel, Judge Stephen Reinhardt, a Carter appointee
and former union-side labor lawyer, was perhaps the most outspoken
liberal critic of the Rehnquist Court among sitting judges.84 Not
coincidentally, he was also one of the judges whose opinions were the
most likely to be reversed by the Supreme Court.85 The next-most-senior
judge, Judge A. Wallace Tashima, a Clinton appointee, was a JapaneseAmerican who had been imprisoned in an internment camp as a child
during World War II.86 The third judge, Judge Marsha Berzon, served as
Supreme Court Justice William Brennan’s first female law clerk and
participated in the drafting of and lobbying for the PDA as a young
attorney before going on to a very successful career as one of the nation’s
most prominent union-side labor lawyers.87 When President Clinton
nominated Judge Berzon to the Ninth Circuit, the Senate dragged its feet
for more than two years before finally confirming her by a vote of 64–34.88
The Ninth Circuit panel concluded that the FMLA was a valid
exercise of Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power and
thus held that Congress properly subjected state employers to monetary
liability for violations of the statute. In the portion of the panel’s opinion
authored by Judge Tashima, the panel held that the FMLA was a
congruent and proportional response to sex discrimination in the leave
policies of public employers.89 Judge Tashima endorsed the government’s
argument that “because women are regarded as having ‘the primary
responsibility for family caretaking’ (both for infants and for sick family
members), employers commonly offer less caretaking leave to men than
to women.” As a result, he explained,

83
See Hibbs v. Dep’t. of Human Res., 273 F.3d 844, 850 (9th Cir. 2001) (collecting
cases), aff’d sub nom. Nev. Dep’t. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
84
See William Overend, Stephen Reinhardt of Ninth Circuit: Liberal U.S. Judge
Swims Against Conservative Tide, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 17, 1986), http://articles.latimes.com/
1986-08-17/news/mn-16516_1_stephen-reinhardt.
85
See Maura Dolan, Stephen Reinhardt, ‘Liberal Lion’ of the Ninth Circuit, Dies at
Eighty-Seven, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2018), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-lnreinhardt-obit-20180329-story.html (noting that, when asked about his response to his
opinions’ frequent reversals by the Supreme Court, Judge Reinhardt said: “If they want to
take away rights, that’s their privilege. But I’m not going to help them do it.”).
86
See David Margolick, Japanese-American Judges Reflect on Internment, N.Y.
TIMES (May 19, 1995), https://www.nytimes.com/1995/05/19/us/japanese-american-judgesreflect-on-internment.html.
87
See 2007 Margaret Brent Awards, Marsha S. Berzon, AM. BAR ASS’N, https://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/women/bios/BerzonBio.authcheckdam.pdf.
88
Neil A. Lewis, After Long Delays, Senate Confirms Two Judicial Nominees, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 10, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/03/10/us/after-long-delays-senateconfirms-2-judicial-nominees.html.
89
Hibbs v. Dep’t. of Human Res., 273 F.3d 844, 869–71 (9th Cir. 2001).
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this kind of gender-discriminatory leave policy is harmful both
to men—because they are not given enough leave to care for
their families—and to women—because reduced leave for men
forces women to spend more time taking care of their families,
and women’s consequently greater needs for caretaking leave
make them less attractive job candidates than men.90
A flat requirement of twelve weeks’ leave for both male and female
employees responded directly to that discrimination.
A concurring opinion authored by Judge Berzon, but joined by the
other two members of the panel, went much further. It concluded that the
FMLA was a proper response not just to sex-discriminatory leave
practices but to the entire edifice of state laws that had, until as late as
the 1970s, limited the work opportunities of women and thus reinforced
“the stereotypical assumption that women are marginal workers whose
fundamental responsibilities are in the home.”91 Those state laws
included protective labor legislation that limited the jobs women could
perform or the hours they could work,92 as well as laws governing
workers’ compensation and other public benefits93—laws that assumed
that women, but not men, were economically dependent on their spouses.
Those laws, Judge Berzon argued, continued to shape societal views
about the proper roles of men and women.94 And, as Judge Berzon wrote,
the FMLA directly responded to them by requiring that both male and
female workers receive twelve weeks of leave for caretaking.95
SUPREME COURT PROCEEDINGS
The Court Takes the Case
The Ninth Circuit’s decision was an obvious candidate for Supreme
Court review. By diverging from the rulings of other courts of appeals,
the decision created a conflict in the circuits—one of the most common
reasons the Supreme Court decides to hear a case.96 And the decision
seemed out of step with the jurisprudence that marked the Rehnquist
Court’s “federalism revolution.” Indeed, in the four years that followed
Boerne, the Court would consider the constitutionality, under Congress’s
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power, of five more statutes—
Id. at 855.
Id. at 860.
92
Id. at 861–63.
93
Id. at 863.
94
Id. at 863–65 (noting that even as federal laws began to prohibit gender
discrimination, decades of state laws based on “stereotypical beliefs about the appropriate
roles of men and women” made up “ ‘volumes of history’ of sex discrimination in the
country”).
95
Id. at 867.
96
See SUP. CT. R. 10 (noting that the existence of a circuit split can be considered as
a factor in whether to grant certiorari); see also H.W. PERRY JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE:
AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 246 (1991) (“Without a doubt, the
single most important generalizable factor in assessing certworthiness is the existence of a
conflict or ‘split’ in the circuits.”).
90
91
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including, notably, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)
and the employment discrimination prohibitions of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA). In each instance, the Court held that the statute
was not a valid exercise of Congress’s power to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment.97 That Hibbs had been decided by a notoriously liberal panel
on a notoriously liberal circuit—at a time when the Supreme Court was
tilting decidedly to the right—was the exclamation point at the end of the
sentence.
The State of Nevada accordingly filed a petition for certiorari in the
Supreme Court.98 Even though the George W. Bush administration
defended the FMLA and urged the Court to deny review of the Ninth
Circuit’s decision,99 few observers expected the Court to take that path.100
And indeed, the Court granted certiorari in June 2002, just as it was
finishing its 2001 Term.101 Argument was set for January 2003, with
briefing to occur during the summer and fall of 2002.
The Oral Argument
When Nevada’s attorney, Deputy Attorney General Paul Taggart,
rose to argue the case on January 15, 2003,102 he had every reason to
expect that the wind would be at his back. The Court had not upheld a
statute as valid Fourteenth Amendment enforcement legislation since
Boerne. And the Court’s post-Boerne cases seemed to adopt a requirement
that Congress could not adopt such legislation without first establishing
“a history and pattern” of constitutional violations by the states.103
Although Congress plainly adopted the FMLA with sex equality in mind,
the legislative history contained very little evidence of discriminatory
conduct by state employers (as opposed to private employers).104 And even
if state employers did engage in unconstitutional discrimination in the
97
See Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (ADA); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents,
528 U.S. 62 (2000) (ADEA); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (Violence
Against Women Act); Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (18 U.S.C. § 3501,
which pertained to the admissibility of criminal confessions); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (Patent and Plant Variety
Protection Remedy Clarification Act).
98
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003)
(No. 01-1368).
99
Brief for the United States in Opposition, Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (No. 01-1368).
100 See, e.g., Edward Walsh, Court Takes Up Family Medical Leave Act; Decision
Could Restrict Federal Laws on States, WASH. POST, June 25, 2002, at A6.
101 Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 536 U.S. 938 (2002).
102 Transcript of Oral Argument at *1–3, Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (No. 01-1368), 2003 WL
145272.
103 Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368 (holding that the employment provisions of the ADEA did
not validly enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, in significant part because Congress did
not identify such a pattern of constitutional violations by the states).
104 Justice Kennedy’s Hibbs dissent emphasized the point. He urged the FMLA’s
legislative history was “devoid of any discussion of the relevant evidence” of a pattern of
unconstitutional state activity. 538 U.S. at 746–49 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). But see id. at
730–35 (majority opinion) (“According to evidence that was before Congress when it enacted
the FMLA, States continue to rely on invalid gender stereotypes in the employment context,
specifically in the administration of leave benefits.”).
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granting of leave, the statute’s universalism seemed to present a serious
problem of proportionality: Why would the proper remedy for
discrimination be a mandate that all workers receive twelve weeks of
leave, rather than a mandate that whatever leave is granted to members
of one sex must be granted to members of the other sex as well? Not
surprisingly, Taggart emphasized these points in his argument.
About nine and a half minutes into Taggart’s time, Justice O’Connor
hit him with the question that would occupy much of the rest of his
argument: what to do with the problematic case of Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer.105
Fitzpatrick involved Congress’s 1972 extension of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act to state employers.106 Title VII prohibits, among other things,
sex discrimination in employment.107 Yet Congress did not amass any
evidence of unconstitutional sex discrimination by state employers in
1972. Indeed, under the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence at the time it was
not at all clear what, if any, sex discrimination in employment violated
the Fourteenth Amendment. Nevertheless, in the 1976 Bitzer case—in an
opinion written by then-Justice Rehnquist—the Court upheld Title VII’s
extension to the states as valid Fourteenth Amendment enforcement
legislation.108 The Bitzer Court had reached that result with virtually no
analysis, but even the Rehnquist Court’s “Federalism Revolution” cases
declined to call Bitzer into question.
Justice O’Connor asked Taggart whether Bitzer “would stand up”
under his argument.109 After all, she noted, in Bitzer, “the Court
unanimously found Title VII was a valid abrogation of the Eleventh
Amendment immunity, and there was no inquiry into the history of
gender discrimination, it was just accepted.”110 Taggart responded that
Title VII would survive even on his analysis because it “closely hewed” to
the Court’s interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause.111 But Justice
Ginsburg then jumped in to note that “part of [his] argument was, if the
discrimination doesn’t exist anymore in the State, even if it did at one
time, then the provision would have to sunset.”112 Noting that “as far as
[T]itle VII is concerned, many States, the vast majority of States have
their own [T]itle VII laws,” she concluded that “at this point in time,”
under Taggart’s reasoning, Bitzer “would have to go.”113

427 U.S. 445 (1976).
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2(1), 86 Stat.
103, 103 (1972) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(a) (2012)) (amending Title VII’s
definition of “persons” counting as employers to include “governments,” “governmental
agencies” and “political subdivisions”).
107 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a) (2012).
108 427 U.S. at 456.
109 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 102, at *10.
110 Id.
111 Id. at *11.
112 Id.
113 Id.
105
106
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Justice Scalia threw Taggart a lifeline, suggesting that it was
“general knowledge” that sex discrimination by state employers was
widespread in 1972,114 but that did not help. Justice Breyer asked
Taggart whether he accepted the proposition that sex discrimination by
state employers remained widespread in 1993, when the FMLA was
passed.115 When Taggart said that he did not, Justice Breyer remarked
that he could not “see the distinction with Title VII. It’s goodbye if I accept
that argument, I think.”116 Although he spent some time at the end
discussing the proportionality of the twelve-week requirement, the risk
his position posed to Title VII had dominated his half of the oral
argument.
In the Supreme Court, William Hibbs was represented by Cornelia
T.L. Pillard, a Georgetown Law Professor and experienced Supreme
Court advocate whom President Obama would later appoint to the United
States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.117 Chief Justice Rehnquist
pressed her on the record of state discrimination in the granting of leave;
Pillard responded with citations to the legislative history.118 Justice
Scalia suggested that it was entirely appropriate for states to give
maternity leave to mothers without giving paternity leave to fathers,
because only mothers had to recover physically from childbirth; Pillard
responded that the states that offered maternity leave provided it for
periods of time that vastly exceeded the time necessary to recover from
pregnancy.119 At that point, Justice Ginsburg stepped in to underscore
that such long leave periods suggested that the states were indulging sexrole stereotypes regarding who does or should care for children.120 Pillard
seized the chance to reinforce the basic feminist argument for
universalism in family and medical leave: “It’s precisely these
assumptions that have caused State employers and other employers to
discriminate against women in hiring, promotion, and retention, and
against men in the dispensing of leave, and these are really two sides of
the same coin.”121
The final advocate to speak was Viet Dinh. Dinh was Pillard’s
Georgetown Law colleague, but at the time he was on leave to serve as
Assistant Attorney General for Legal Policy. Throughout the “Federalism
Revolution,” the Bush administration’s Department of Justice had felt an
institutional obligation to strongly defend the constitutionality of federal
laws—a position that had put its lawyers at odds with the Rehnquist
Id. at *13.
Id. at *14.
116 Id. at *14–15.
117 Professor Cornelia “Nina” Pillard Confirmed to D.C. Circuit, GEO. L. (Dec. 12,
2013),
https://www.law.georgetown.edu/news/press-releases/professor-nina-pillardconfirmed-dc-circuit.cfm.
118 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 102, at *26–28.
119 Id. at *28–31.
120 Id. at *31.
121 Id. at *31.
114
115
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Court in some cases. Dinh spent much of his time at the lectern defending
the appropriateness of the twelve-week leave period chosen by
Congress.122
In an article reviewing the oral argument the next day, longtime
New York Times Supreme Court reporter Linda Greenhouse suggested
that the outcome of the case was still unclear. But she said that Justice
O’Connor’s questions about the case’s implications for Title VII “offered a
hint” of hope that Justice O’Connor might join the four more liberal
Justices to uphold the FMLA. As Greenhouse observed, “it was hardly a
secret in the courtroom that Justice O’Connor represented the[ ] only
hope of picking up a fifth vote against a further expansion of state
immunity.”123
The Court’s Decision
When the Court issued its decision on May 27, 2003, Justice
O’Connor had indeed joined the four more liberal Justices to uphold the
FMLA as valid Fourteenth Amendment enforcement legislation. But
there was a surprise sixth vote for that position: Chief Justice Rehnquist,
who had been the leader of the Court’s federalism revolution. In an even
more surprising turn, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion for the
Court. His opinion squarely endorsed the feminist universalist premises
that underlay the statute. He explained that Congress had adopted the
statute as a response to sex discrimination that was driven by “mutually
reinforcing stereotypes”:
Stereotypes about women’s domestic roles are reinforced by
parallel stereotypes presuming a lack of domestic
responsibilities for men. Because employers continued to regard
the family as the woman’s domain, they often denied men
similar accommodations or discouraged them from taking leave.
These mutually reinforcing stereotypes created a self-fulfilling
cycle of discrimination that forced women to continue to assume
the role of primary family caregiver, and fostered employers’
stereotypical views about women’s commitment to work and
their value as employees. Those perceptions, in turn, Congress
reasoned, lead to subtle discrimination that may be difficult to
detect on a case-by-case basis.124
The universal twelve-week leave mandate, Chief Justice Rehnquist
concluded, directly responded to both sides of this cycle of stereotypes:
“By creating an across-the-board, routine employment benefit for all
eligible employees, Congress sought to ensure that family-care leave
would no longer be stigmatized as an inordinate drain on the workplace
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 102, at *38–48.
Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court: Checks and Balances; Medical Leave Act
Is Debated in Major Federalism Case, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/
2003/01/16/us/supreme-court-checks-balances-medical-leave-act-debated-major-federalism
-case.html.
124 Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736 (2003).
122
123
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caused by female employees, and that employers could not evade leave
obligations simply by hiring men.”125
Distinguishing the Court’s earlier opinions involving the ADEA and
the ADA, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion explained that “age- or
disability-based distinctions” triggered only minimal rational basis
scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment.126 Gender discrimination, by
contrast, “triggers a heightened level of scrutiny.”127 It is thus “easier for
Congress to show a pattern of state constitutional violations,” Chief
Justice Rehnquist noted, in the gender discrimination context.128 By
making this move, Chief Justice Rehnquist effectively shielded all of Title
VII—not just its sex discrimination provision—from challenge, as the
statute bars discrimination based on race, sex, and religion, all forms of
discrimination that trigger heightened constitutional scrutiny.
Justice Souter, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, filed a brief
concurrence. Justice Souter emphasized that, by joining Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s majority opinion, he should not be understood as embracing
the broader federalism jurisprudence on which that opinion relied.129
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment only. He argued that Congress
had power under the Commerce Clause to abrogate Nevada’s sovereign
immunity, so he did not have to reach the question whether the FMLA
was proper legislation to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.130
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas all dissented. The principal
dissent, authored by Justice Kennedy, argued that Congress simply had
not developed a sufficient record of unconstitutional state gender
discrimination in the specific context of leave programs.131 Justice
Kennedy contended that the record amassed by Congress focused
primarily on the actions of the private sector, not of states; that the
evidence of state action simply involved the failure to provide adequate
leave rather than sex-based discrimination under the Fourteenth
Amendment; and that a universal 12-week mandate was not
appropriately tied to any constitutional violation.132 Justice Scalia added
a brief dissent of his own to argue that, even if the FMLA validly
abrogates state sovereign immunity in general (a proposition he rejected),
Nevada should still have the opportunity to demand proof that it—and
not other states—had committed sufficient constitutional violations to
warrant abrogation of its sovereign immunity.133

125
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Id. at 737.
Id. at 735.
Id. at 736.
Id.
See id. at 740 (Souter, J., concurring).
See id. at 740–741 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 744–59 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
See id. at 746–756.
See id. at 741–744 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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THE AFTERMATH
In the immediate aftermath of the Court’s decision, much of the
commentary surrounding Hibbs focused on Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
surprising defection from his usual states’-rights position. Had Chief
Justice Rehnquist begun to drift from the very federalism revolution that
had been the centerpiece of his chief justiceship?
Greenhouse, for her part, suggested that the answer was “[n]ot
evolution, perhaps, but life.” She noted that Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
daughter was “a single mother who until recently held a high-pressure
job and sometimes had child-care problems.” “Several times” during the
Term the Court decided Hibbs, Chief Justice Rehnquist was called upon
to “le[ave] work early to pick up his granddaughters from school.” These
experiences, she offered, may have given him a newfound “solicitude for
the usefulness of the Family and Medical Leave Act in erasing the
‘pervasive sex-role stereotype that caring for family members is women’s
work.’ ”134
Yale Law Professor Robert Post, by contrast, suggested that the
answer could be found in the topic that drew extensive discussion at oral
argument—the concern that a ruling against the FMLA might call Title
VII into question.135 Title VII is the centerpiece of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, a statute that many across the political spectrum regard as
something close to sacred.136 Although Chief Justice Rehnquist’s own
jurisprudence had generally sought to narrow the application of Title VII,
he might well have worried that encouraging a frontal attack on the
constitutionality of the statute would invite widespread charges that the
Court was acting illegitimately.137
But the future was not as kind to the feminist universalism that the
Court endorsed in Hibbs. The year after the Court’s decision in Hibbs,
George Washington University Law Professor Michael Selmi wrote that
it was “clear” that the FMLA had “not accomplished its goals with respect
to combating stereotypes or discrimination against women in the
134 Linda Greenhouse, Ideas & Trends: Evolving Opinions; Heartfelt Words from the
Rehnquist Court, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/06/weekin
review/ideas-trends-evolving-opinions-heartfelt-words-from-the-rehnquist-court.html.
135 See Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts,
and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 11–41 (2003).
136 See, e.g., Norbert Schlei, Foreword to BARBARA SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW vii (2d ed. 1983) (“The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was the
most important civil rights legislation of this century. Title VII of that Act . . . has been its
most important part.”).
137 One model for this type of analysis employed by Chief Justice Rehnquist is his
treatment of the decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Chief Justice
Rehnquist, a longstanding critic of Miranda, consistently voted to narrow its application
and to introduce and broaden exceptions to it. But when a frontal challenge to Miranda
came before the Court in 2000, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion for the Court
rejecting the challenge. “Miranda,” Chief Justice Rehnquist observed, “has become
embedded in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become part of
our national culture.” Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000).
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workplace.”138 If anything, he argued, “the statute has likely exacerbated
both, though probably only to a socially insignificant degree.”139
The universalist approach of the FMLA has had two evident
limitations. First, even though the statute provides parental and familycare leave to all covered workers without regard to their gender, female
workers continue to take the leave far more frequently than do male
workers.140 This pattern of female-dominated leave-taking persists across
the world.141 Some countries have made progress in addressing this
imbalance, but have done so only by adopting policies that cut against the
FMLA’s universalist structure: either (a) abandoning universalism by
specifically requiring fathers to take certain periods of leave; or (b) setting
aside some leave periods for each parent, which may not be transferred
to the other parent and will be forfeited if the assigned parent does not
take them.142 In contrast to those approaches, which effectively single out
fathers and impose some cost on them for failing to take parental leave,
the FMLA’s universal model does little to alter the reality that women,
far more than men, take that leave in our current world. That reality, in
turn, is likely to entrench the stereotype that women, not men, take care
of newborn children—despite the formally universal coverage of the
statute.143 To the extent that the feminist supporters of the FMLA
thought that a universally framed law would avoid encouraging
employers to discriminate against women, the actual pattern of leavetaking suggests that the law has fallen short of that goal.144
The drafters of the FMLA anticipated that women would likely
continue to take more parental leave than men (though they do not seem
138 Michael Selmi, Is Something Better than Nothing? Critical Reflections on Ten
Years of the FMLA, 15 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 65, 67 (2004).
139 Id.
140 See Wen-Jui Han & Jane Waldfogel, Parental Leave: The Impact of Recent
Legislation on Parents’ Leave Taking, 40 DEMOGRAPHY 191, 198 (2003) (“Our results for
men indicate that the FMLA and state leave laws have not been associated with more leave
taking or longer leaves by recent fathers. There is little or no indication in our data that
more fathers take leaves or that they take longer leaves when they are entitled to more
weeks of leave.”).
141 See Ariane Hegewisch & Janet C. Gornick, The Impact of Work-Family Policies on
Women’s Employment: A Review of Research from OECD Countries, 14 COMMUNITY, WORK
& FAM. 119, 127–28 (2011) (“In principle, in many countries mothers and fathers are able
to share their parental leave entitlement, yet in most countries women are not only more
likely to take up leave but are also the sole participants in leave.”).
142 See id. at 127 (noting, for example, Portugal’s obligatory five-day leave policy for
new fathers, as well as Iceland’s nine-month-per-child system, which provides three months
for each parent and three months that may be divided among them).
143 See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Universalism and Civil Rights (With Notes on Voting
Rights After Shelby), 123 YALE L.J. 2838, 2864–66 (2014) (arguing that whether a law is
understood as universal will often depend on its social meaning and impact on the world
rather than its formal coverage).
144 The effect cannot be great, however, as empirical evidence suggests that the
FMLA, overall, had “no significant impacts . . . on women’s employment or wages in the
years after the policy went into effect.” Maya Rossin-Slater, Maternity and Family Leave
Policy 12 (IZA Inst. of Labor Econ., Discussion Paper No. 10500, 2017), http://www.nber.
org/papers/w23069.pdf.
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to have anticipated just how great the disparity would be). That is why
they included self-care leave, along with parental and family-care leave,
in the statute’s twelve-week mandate. As we have seen, because the
drafters expected that both men and women would take self-care leave,
they believed that the FMLA as a whole would not give employers a
meaningful incentive to discriminate against members of either gender.
To a large extent, the drafters’ expectation has proven true. Leave to
address an employee’s own serious health condition has accounted for
more than half of the leave taken under the FMLA.145 But this has led to
the second problem with the statute’s universalist framing. Many
employers complain that accommodating self-care leave is extremely
burdensome, especially because such leave is likely to be taken
intermittently and unpredictably, thus impeding efforts at workforce
planning.146 Because the statute ties self-care leave together with
parental and family leave, employer discontent with self-care leave has
fed a backlash against the FMLA as a whole. This backlash, in turn,
creates obstacles to enacting in the United States the sorts of paid family
leave policies embraced by most other industrialized countries—and it is
precisely this type of leave that is most likely to open up employment
opportunities to women.147 The FMLA’s universalist framing thus may be
making it harder to adopt policies that could be more effective in
promoting workplace equality.
The Supreme Court’s most important post-Hibbs decision on the
FMLA, in fact, involved the self-care leave provision. In Coleman v. Court
of Appeals of Maryland, decided in 2012, the Court considered whether
the self-care leave provision of the FMLA validly enforced the Fourteenth
Amendment.148 With Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor no
longer on the bench, their replacements, Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Alito, joined the three Hibbs dissenters to hold that the self-care
provision was not a proper exercise of the enforcement power.149 Justice
Kennedy’s plurality opinion did not question Hibbs. But it held that the
FMLA’s self-care provision, unlike the family-care provision at issue in
Hibbs, lacked a sufficient connection to gender discrimination.150 In
dissent, Justice Ginsburg cogently explained the universalist position
taken by the statute’s drafters—that the self-care provision was
necessary to ensure that the FMLA did not lead to discrimination against
women.151 The Coleman decision thus further highlights the limits of the
FMLA’s feminist universalism.
See, e.g., Suk, supra note 45, at 19.
See id. at 21–22.
147 See id. at 46–49 (noting in particular that the “generous” maternity and parental
leave policies available in France and Sweden are possible precisely because they are
prioritized above and separated from other types of medical and family leave).
148 566 U.S. 30 (2012).
149 Id. at 37–39, 44–45.
150 See id. at 33–42.
151 See id. at 47–51 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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***
Hibbs ultimately is a case with a mixed legacy. For the Supreme
Court to embrace the key arguments of feminist universalism
represented a triumph for an important school of thought within legal
feminism. For the Court’s opinion to be written by Chief Justice
Rehnquist of all people was almost delicious. But the triumph came at a
time when the limitations of the FMLA’s approach were becoming
apparent. To achieve the goals of justice and equality in and out of the
workplace, feminists have increasingly realized that it is necessary to
move beyond the universalist paradigm.

